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ABSTRACT: This paper tackles the question of the anticipation of the supply chain partner’s decisional behaviour 
under uncertain criteria. In other words, we propose a model to support sequential decisions under uncertainty where 
the decision maker has to make hypothesis about the decision criteria. For example, Hurwicz criterion weights extreme 
optimism and pessimism positions and a classic criticism of this criterion consisting in the difficulty of the weight 
assessment and the involving decision instability. To achieve this, we present a method based on fuzzy representation of 
weight vision. Finally, the model allows sequential decision of a Decision Tree to be compute thanks a pignistic 
probabilities treatment of the fuzzy representation of the decision maker optimism-pessimism index. This approach is 
illustrated through an industrial case study. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Industrial problem statement 
For an industrial Decision Maker (DM) in a supply 
chain, the anticipation of his partners’ decisional 
behavior faced to uncertainty is a current complex real 
life situation. Knowing that his decision will be followed 
by a sequence of partners’ decisions and other uncertain 
events, he has to anticipate and integrate the rational 
behavior of these partners during their own decision-
making processes. In this paper, we more specifically  
consider a Supplier-Customer relationship from a dyadic 
supply chain. The customer is a worldwide dermo-
cosmetic manufacturer and the supplier is a packaging 
product manufacturer. We adopt the point of view of an 
industrial manager of the customer who has to study the 
possibility to improve his supply chain performance in 
implementing new forms of collaboration. He has to 
choose between traditional and advanced ordering 
methods (decision also called here collaboration protocol 
choice). Furthermore, a second decision will concern the 
parameter setting of this protocol. But, the customer DM 
knows that the supplier will define his lot sizing strategy 
in response (third decision). This situation may be 
described as a multi-agent sequential decision problem. 
In addition to the “sequential” dimension, the DM is 
confronted to a multi-actor problem. So, decisions will 
not be made with the same performance objective. Each 
actor may seek to achieve his or her own performance 
criteria (inventory level, stock-out, order fulfillment…). 
 
Furthermore, these sequential and multi-actor decisions 
have to be taken on the basis of future uncertain events 
(scraps, breakdowns, delays…). Here, we will not focus 
on the detail of these events. We only consider a global 
event that influences the performance evaluation. In our 
example, the customer is a worldwide manufacturer who 
is able to build and to analyze a lot of historical data. He 
can therefore have a given behavior in front of 
uncertainty. The problem is the anticipation of the 
partner’s behavior: optimistic, pessimistic…? 
 
1.2 Research objective 
A decision problem can be defined as a situation where a 
Decision Maker (DM) has to choose between several 
possibilities. This decision is referred to as a decision 
under or with uncertainty, when, at the decision time, the 
DM is not able to perfectly anticipate the results of his 
choices. Furthermore, in a real dynamic situation, the 
DM does not make a single decision, but a sequence 
thereof, characterized by a sequential arrival of relevant 
pieces of information. Consequently, the decision 
depends on the information available at the decision time 
such as a supplier who is waiting for the details of the 
contract with his customer to fix his 
inventory/production strategy according to his 
perception of the future possible market behavior. For all 
that, the first decision (protocol) has to take into account 
the future decisions (supplier’s inventory strategy) and 
events (uncertain performance). This kind of problem is 
called uncertain dynamic (or sequential) decision and is 
supported by the use of Decision Trees (DT).  
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Whether individual or collective, a decision problem can 
be defined as a situation where a DM has to choose a 
decision d* among a set of possibilities,  
pddD ;...;1 , 
which have assessable consequences (Bouyssou et al. 
2009). Let S be the set of possible states of the world that 
will be met after choosing d* D , and X the set of the 
potential consequences. The DM’s choice of d* could be 
defined as a function fd* from S to X that associates to 
each possibility s  S a precise consequence fd*(s)  X. 
 
)(
:
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*
sfs
XSf
d
d

  
(1)  
The value (also called utility function) attached to each 
result can be represented as an application u from X to RI   
that associates for each fd(s)  X a value u(fd(s))  RI  
(Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947). 
     sfusf
Xu
dd 
R:   
(2)  
 
The expression “decision under uncertainty” is often 
used to describe a decision situation with a lack of 
knowledge about S. This lack of knowledge could be 
detailed in two points: (i) different states of the word 
could be met (S could be composed by more than a 
single state: S={s1;…;sS}) and (ii) the level of knowledge 
about the likelihood of each of these states may be poor. 
The terms “risk” and “uncertainty” are currently and 
differently used in the literature to describe this second 
dimension. According to Knight’s distinction (Knight 
1921), decisions under risk refer to decision situations 
where the DM is able to describe S by means of a known 
or a knowable probability distribution. Otherwise, he 
speaks about decision under uncertainty. 
 
Confronted to the lack of knowledge, each possible 
choice of DM induces two potential consequences. The 
choice made by the DM depends on the assessment 
made to characterize the two possible situations. 
Different evaluation functions (V) have been proposed 
to characterize the DM’s behavior in the face of risk or 
uncertainty. Faced with uncertainty, models based on 
likelihood assessment of the situation have been 
developed (Expected (V  EU) and Subjective Utilities 
(V  SEU), (Von Neumann et Morgenstern 1947; 
Savage 1954)). DT computation is based on these 
models. However, whether objective or subjective, the 
use of probability distributions is confronted to two main 
difficulties: (i) the DM’s capacity to estimate the 
probability of each possible event (Moussa et al. 2006); 
(ii) the problem of the unique probability assumption. 
We refer to the Allais paradox (EU) (Allais 1953) or 
Ellsberg paradox (SEU) (Ellsberg 1961); they show that 
the risk perception depends on the context and the DM. 
Therefore, in some cases, EU or SEU cannot describe the 
DM’s behavior and the decision theory proposes 
different criteria. If a uniform probability distribution on 
possible states is used, Laplace criterion  LV   is a 
probabilistic way to model the DM behavior faced to the 
lack of information. The Wald criterion, also called 
maximin  WV  and maximax  WV  is an 
approach based on a qualitative representation of the 
DM’s attraction to respectively the worst or the best 
situation (Wald 1950). Hurwitz (1951) proposes to 
weigh these two extreme behaviors with a parameter  
in order to reflect the DM’s pessimism degree (or 
optimism degree).  This criterion  HV   allows the 
DM’s optimism degree to be more precisely described. 
The Savage regret-based decision model (1951) (also 
called minmax regret  SV  ) proposes to make 
decisions based on the extent to which a decision-maker 
could have done better ex-post. 
 
Faced to this diversity of criteria, a lot of authors have 
studied the capability of each of them to model the 
behavior of the DM facing a lack of knowledge. The 
present paper is focused on the complete ignorance 
situation (no information about a probability 
distribution). Seale et al. (1995) underline the inability of 
SWWL ,,,   “to account for individual differences” 
between DMs. “Aside from differences in the utility for 
outcomes, all the DMs are supposed to behave 
identically. The only exception is Hurwicz model”. The 
differential subjective weighting factors allow variability 
in behavior across individuals to be represented (eq. 3). 
            sfusfufH d
Ss
d
Ss
du

 max1min   (3)  
   du
Dd
fHd

 maxarg*  (4)  
 
However, this coefficient (also called optimism-
pessimism (o-p) index) is also the weak point of the 
criterion (Seale et al. 1995, Ballestero 2002) :  (i) 
implicit is the assumption that each DM has a unique and 
stable o-p index; (ii) as shown by the multitude of 
questionnaires or other scales purporting to measure the 
o-p index, this evaluation is a hard task whose propensity 
to capture the actual o-p index is disputed; (iii) it is 
difficult to estimate the o-p index with precision from 
experimental protocols (an interval is easier); (iv) 
decision may be very unstable in the vicinity of 
particular value(s) of the o-p index (noted α* in the 
Figure 1) where the evaluations of each decision 
consequence may be close. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the sensitivity of the evaluation 
function to the value of  where a DM has to choose 
between 2 decisions a1 and a2. In this example, a1 has to 
be preferred if  < * and a2 if  > *. 
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Figure 1 : Decision using Hurwicz coefficient 
The purpose of this paper is to tackle these weaknesses 
through the proposition of a model allowing a stable 
decision to be extracted from a fuzzy knowledge of a 
partner’s optimism-pessimism index.  
 
We propose the use of both Hurwicz criterion and 
pignistic probabilities (Smets, 2005) to compute decision 
trees. To achieve this, we provide some background on 
possibility theory, pignistic probability and decision 
trees. Then, we present our proposition to model and 
support the decision-making process. Finally, we 
illustrate this proposition through our industrial case 
study before concluding and proposing future research 
works. 
2 BACKGROUND 
2.1 Representation of imprecision 
In this section, we present a model to represent the 
imprecision on the information (possibility distribution) 
and a measure that evaluates the stability of the decision 
(pignistic probability).  
2.1.1 Possibility distribution  
Imprecise information is modeled by expressions of the 
form Av  where A is a subset of S that contains more 
than one element. Imprecision is always expressed by a 
disjunction of values (Dubois and Prade, 2009) defined 
by a possibility distribution on S. Av  means that all 
values from v outside A are supposed to be impossible.  
 
A possibility distribution v  attached to an ill-known 
quantity v quantifies the plausibility of values taken by v. 
v  is a function of S into the scale of plausibility L 
([0,1] for numerical possibility). 
 
A numerical possibility distribution defines a random set 
(m,F)π , having, for i=1,…,M, the following focal sets Ei 
with masses m(Ei) (Dubois and Prade 1982) : 
 
 




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
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Em
xSxE

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2.1.2 Pignistic probability distribution  
The pignistic probability is based on the Laplace 
principle, it consists in supposing an equal repartition of 
masses m(E) over each element of focal set E for a 
random set (m,F) (eq.6). It has been proposed by (Smets, 
2005) and is equivalent to the Shapley value (Shapley 
1953) in game theory. 
 
Sx
E
Em
xPg
FxSE
S  
 ,
)(
)( . (6) 
The pignistic probability distribution is used in 
simulation of “fuzzy variables” (Chanas and 
Nowakowski, 1988). It can be viewed as the subjective 
probability the decision-maker would provide, had his 
knowledge be faithfully represented by the possibility 
distribution v . 
For example, we have possibility distribution over two 
possible criteria: 1)( 1  c  8.0)( 2  c . To compute 
the pignistic probability of each criterion 
 Let us first compute the masses )( iEm  of the criterion.  
In this case, the values of i  are linked to the possibility 
degree of the choice of the different criteria: thus they 
are discrete values: 00  ; 8.01  ; 12  . 
–  211 ;ccE   with 08.0)( 1 Em  
–  12 cE   with 8.01)( 2 Em  
From equation 6 we have 4.0
2
8.0
2
)(
)( 11 
Em
cPg  
and 6.02.0
2
8.0
1
)(
2
)(
)( 211 
EmEm
cPg   
 
Motivation: While in a finite case providing subjective 
probability degrees makes sense, it is too difficult for a 
DM to provide precise continuous subjective probability. 
In that case it is more user-friendly to ask for weak 
information (like support and mode), represent it 
faithfully in possibility theory, and extract the pignistic 
probability from it.  
 
2.2 Sequential decision  
In a real dynamic situation, the DM does not make a 
single decision, but a sequence of decisions 
characterized by a sequential arrival of relevant pieces 
information. This type of problem is called uncertain 
dynamic decision. The decision made at time t depends 
on the information available at t. By hypothesis, the 
information known at t is still known at t+t . The 
incoming information is currently presented as “events. 
They are the results of an external independent entity, for 
example nature. In such conditions, we can call 
 mttt ee ;...;1  and  nttt ee 11 11 ;...;    the sets of known 
events at time t and t+1. t+1 defines a partition of the 
set t . We call  T
T
DDD ,...,1  the set of decisions that 
have been made at times (D1) < time(D2) < … < 
time(DT) respectively. 
MOSIM’12 - June 06-08, 2012 - Bordeaux - France 
 
This kind of problem has induced many research works 
and specifically in the Artificial Intelligence literature. 
They are relevant in situations where a DM has a 
sequence of decisions (at prescribed times) to make. In 
this context, a strategy, called , is defined as a 
particular sequence of choices among the decisions (one 
choice per decision). The set of all strategies is denoted 
by 
T
 . The target is therefore to support the DM who 
must choose the best strategy, 

T
max* . All decisions 
are fixed when the strategy is applied. 
 
A Decision Tree (DT) is often used to represent this kind 
of decisions. A DT may be defined as a directed graph T 
= (Ɲ,Ɛ) with Ɲ the set of nodes and Ɛ the set of arcs 
inside which there exists a unique node (root node), from 
which there is a single path between each node. The set 
of nodes is made of (Nielsen and Jaffray 2006): 
– ƝD : the set of decision nodes (represented by 
squares). They characterize states where the DM 
has to decide and to choose one alternative among 
several ones. Each output arc of a decision node 
represents an alternative (some d  
i
D ) ; 
– ƝC : the set of chance (or event) nodes (represented 
by circles). Event nodes represent the sources of 
uncertainty in the problem, i.e. nature states. Each 
output arc of an event node shows a possible state 
of the world after the event occurred (some s  S); 
– C : the set of terminal nodes (leaves). A leaf is 
defined as a node without children (child(N)=, 
with NC) and represents a terminal state of the 
sequential decision problem (a final consequence). 
A utility value is associated to each node (u(N), N 
 C). 
In a DT, a strategy  is therefore defined as a set of arcs: 
 = {(N, N’) : N  ƝD

, N’ Ɲ}  Ɛ where ƝD

 = ƝD  
Ɲ and Ɲ  Ɲ is the set of nodes involved in the 
strategy , i.e. the set of nodes made of : 
– The root node : Nr (a decision by hypothesis); 
– A unique child for each decision of the strategy, i.e. 
N  ƝD
 
; 
– All the children of an event node met in the 
strategy, i.e. N  ƝC

 = ƝC  Ɲ

. 
We call 
T
 , the set of strategies in a given DT, T. An 
example of DT is given on Figure 2. It represents a 
decision situation where a DM has to decide D1, then the 
event E1 will occur, after what a second decision D2 will 
be made followed by a last event E2. Formally: 
– ƝD ={D1; D2}, with 
 2111
1
;ddD    and  
2
2
1
2
2
;ddD   ; 
– ƝC ={E1; E2}, with 
 2111 ;1 eeSE   and  
2
2
1
2;2 eeSE  ; 
–  
2
1
1
11 ;ee  and 
 12211221221112112 ;;; eeeeeeee   
 
 
Figure 2 : Example of Decision Tree 
Table 1 provides the list of strategies induced by this 
tree. The strategy illustrated on Figure 2 (in bold) 
appears in grey in the Table 1. Enumerating the 
strategies may become a very hard computational 
problem because of the complexity of the decision 
situation (the number of strategies increases 
exponentially). Different methods have been proposed to 
find the best strategy. 
Table 1: Enumeration of strategies 
The main method is based on the backward induction 
principle (or dynamic programming).  The DT is visited 
from the leaves to the root by reasoning on subtrees. It is 
based on the consequentialism concept, proposed by 
Hammond (1988) then discussed by Machina (1989). To 
summarize, a consequentialist DM does not take into 
account past events and is focused only on the future 
choices and events. It is now demonstrated that this 
sophisticated behavior is efficient for probabilistic 
models. However, with non-probabilistic models, it may 
fail to extract the best strategy from 
T
 . Therefore, 
alternative approaches have been developed such as 
Resolute Choice by (McClennen (1990), or Veto-Process 
by Jaffray  (1999) and Nielsen and Jaffray (2006). The 
first one enforces, by definition, the dynamic consistency 
of the DM. The second one allows dynamic 
programming advantages to be preserved by extending 
the spectrum of strategies considered by each node. 
 
Strategy Description Consequences 
    2 cardcard i   
Eval. 
1  2112111211 ;; eifdeifdd   6521 ;;;1 uuuu   1V  
2  2122112211 ;; eifdeifdd   8743 ;;;2 uuuu   2V
 
3  2122111211 ;; eifdeifdd   8721 ;;;3 uuuu   3V  
4  2112112211 ;; eifdeifdd   6543 ;;;4 uuuu   4V  
5  2112111221 ;; eifdeifdd   1413109 ;;;5 uuuu   5V  
6  2122112221 ;; eifdeifdd   16151211 ;;;6 uuuu   6V  
7  2122111221 ;; eifdeifdd   1615109 ;;;7 uuuu   7V
 
8  2112112221 ;; eifdeifdd   14131211 ;;;8 uuuu   8V  
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2.3 Game theory 
The previous part has presented research work about 
dynamic decision from the Artificial Intelligence 
literature point of view. Associated methods are based 
on a common hypothesis: all decisions of the dynamic 
decision problem have to be made by the same DM. 
However, many real-life situations, such as met in SCM, 
involve multi-actor confrontation and collaboration 
levels. Consequently, the optimal choice for a DM 
depends on the others DM. DMs are described as in 
strategic interaction. It clearly defines a game theory 
context where each DM may be seen as a player that 
seeks to maximize his own profit. A game could be 
cooperative or non cooperative. In the first class of 
games, all players are linked with restrictive 
agreement(s). They define a coalition. In the second 
class of games, it is not possible to organize coalitions. 
This kind of game could be described in two different 
ways: 
– Strategic form game: collection of strategies 
defining all the possible actions of each player in 
all possible situations with associated profits (also 
called payoffs). 
– Extensive form game: tree that describes how the 
game is played. It is a dynamic description of the 
game because it specifies the sequence of decisions 
made by players. An event may be considered in a 
node, where “nature” will choose randomly a 
situation at different times of the game. Each 
decision node represents a player who has to decide 
and information available at a prescribed time. 
Payoffs (potential consequences for each player) 
associated to each scenario (a particular sequence 
of decisions and events) are represented by the 
leaves. 
 
According to the interactions occurring between SC 
partners, SCM has become a natural application area for 
of game-theory. These game-theoretical applications in 
SCM have been differently surveyed: from a game-
theoretical point of view (Cachon and Netessine 2006) or 
from SCM attributes point of view (Cachon 2003; Leng 
and Parlar 2005). These surveys show that a lot of 
models have been proposed in order to study the impact 
of given SCM decision levels (inventory-related 
decisions, decision in production/pricing, revenue 
sharing, quantity flexibility contract…). Here, we 
address the specific question of non-zero sum non-
cooperative dynamic games with perfect (no 
simultaneous decision) symmetric (the same knowledge 
for all players) and complete (each player knows all 
strategies and associated payoffs) information. 
Furthermore, this game is not repeated. Therefore, 
algorithms based on the Dynamic Programming 
principle, i.e., backward induction, have to be preferred 
to search and find (if they exist) equilibria in this kind of 
game (Cachon and Netessine 2006). 
3 DEFINITION OF PROBLEM WITH PERFECT 
KNOWLEDGE ON CRITERIA 
In this paper we address a particular problem of 
sequential decision involving two decision makers (DM1 
and DM2). Moreover, we consider that DM1 takes 
his/her decision before DM2 ignoring the behavior of 
DM2 and of nature that plays just once. Both DMs can 
use different criteria to make the decision. This problem 
can be modeled by a decision tree (Figure 3).  
 
If we consider that DM1 perfectly knows the criterion of 
DM2 (and his/her own), the problem can easily be 
solved by dynamic programming: 
– For each node j of decision of DM2, choice of the 
optimal decision *2jd  using the criteria of DM2.  
– Then, choice of the optimal decision 1*d  of DM1 
using the criteria of DM1 and taking into account 
the decision of DM2. 
In real context, DM1 and DM2 have limited knowledge 
of their own decision criterion (their precise degree of 
optimism for example) with precision. Furthermore 
DM1 does not know with precision the decision criterion 
of DM2. In this context, a stable decision has to be made 
in front of uncertainty regarding these criteria.  
 
 
Figure 3 : Decision tree of problem considered 
Thus, in the next section, we propose to solve the 
previous problem in the context of imperfect knowledge 
on criteria considering that this imperfect knowledge is 
modeled with possibility distributions on o-p indices. 
4 RESOLUTION OF PROBLEM UNDER 
IMPRECISION ON CRITERIA 
In this section, we first introduce the main principles of 
our method of choosing a stable decision in a game with 
two players when (i) DM1 makes his decision before 
DM2 and (ii) DM1 knows with imperfection both DM1 
and DM2 criteria. Then, we detail some steps of this 
method when (i) both DM1 and DM2 criteria are 
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Hurwicz criteria and (ii) the optimism degree of this 
criterion is known with imprecision.  
 
4.1 Approach overview 
To evaluate the stability of decisions in front of the 
possible criteria, we choose to use the concept of 
pignistic probabilities (i.e. §2.1.2). Indeed the decision 
that has the maximal pignistic probability to be optimal 
is the one that is optimal for most criteria, taking into 
account the uncertainty on the criterion.  
In order to compute the pignistic probability of each 
decision (stability degree), we have to know for which 
criteria this decision is optimal and then to sum the 
pignistic probabilities of these criteria. 
 
In the considered problem the decision of DM1 depends 
on the criteria of DM1 and DM2. To solve this problem 
we have to solve a decision tree for each combination of 
criteria ( 21 CC  ). In the context of imprecise on o-p 
indices for Hurwicz criterion, an efficient method is 
proposed to compute the set of criteria for which a given 
decision is optimal (§4.2.2).  
4.1.1 Method 
We adopt the following notations:  
– 
iC  : set of criteria of ic  of DMi with i=1 to 2 
– 1D  : set of decisions 1d  of DM1 
– 2jD : set of decisions 
2
jd  of DM2    
– j : index of decision node of DM2 with j=1 to 1D   
– 
22
1 ... JDDD  : set of decision vectors 
),...,( 221
2
Jddd 

 of DM2 
–  optimalisdcdC 2222 )(

 : set of criteria 22 Cc   
for which decision vector 2d

 is optimal. 
–  optimalareddccddC 21212112 &),(),(

 : set of 
pairs of criteria ),( 21 cc  for which
1d  is optimal 
for 11 Cc   and 2d

 is optimal for 22 Cc  . 
–  optimalisdccdC 12111 ),()(  : set of pairs of 
criteria ),( 21 cc  for which decision 
1d  is optimal 


Dd
ddCdC


2
),()( 211211  
– )(Pg ic  : Pignistic probability of criteria ic  
– )(Pg 1d  is the pignistic probability that 1d  is an 
optimal decision. The optimality of the decision 
depends on the criterion 
1c of DM1 and the criteria 
2c  of DM2. It depends on the probability to have 
1c  and
2c . So )(Pg
1d  is the sum of the 
probabilities of pairs ),( 21 cc for which
1d  is 
optimal. 
 
Thus, the problem of stability maximization can be 
written as follows (eq. 7): 
   

 






)(
21
),(
21
1
1
11
2112 2
11
11
)Pg()(Pgmax
)Pg()(Pgmax
)(Pgmax
dC
Dd
ddC Dd
Dd
Dd
cc
cc
d
 
. (7) 
 
Method to choose the most opti-stable decision 
11 Dd   : 
 
– Step 1. Computation of )( 22 dC

 for each vector 
Dd 2

 (cf §4.3) 
– Step 2. Computation of ),( 2112 ddC

 for each 
vector 2d

 such that )( 22 dC

 and each 11 Dd   
(cf §4.4) 
– Step 3. Computation of 


Dd
ddCdC
2
),()( 2112
1
1 

 
for each 11 Dd   
– Step 4. Selection of the decision 11 Dd   such that 
 
)(
21
1
)Pg()(Pg
dC
cc  is maximal 
 
4.1.2 Example 
We illustrate the method in a general context, where 
DM1 does not know if DM2 will use the minmax criteria 
(with probability 0.6) or Laplace (with probability 0.4) 
and DM1 doesn’t know if he/she will use the indicator 
),,( 21 nddg (with probability 0.7) ),,( 21 nddh (with 
probability 0.3) within the criteria minmax :   
– 








 
n
n N
ndf
ndfC
),(
;),(max 22
2  
–  ),,(max;),,(max 21211 nddhnddgC
nn
  
 
DM1 has 2 possible decisions {1;2} and DM2 has two 
possible decisions {one, two} and the nature three 
possible realisations {a, b, c}. The evaluation of decision 
strategies is represented on Table 2 and Figure 4.  
 
  f(d,n) g(d,n) h(d,n) 
DM1 DM2 max Laplace max max 
1 one 10 8 10 12 
 two 14 7 11 10 
2 one 20 10 14 11 
 two 15 12 9 15 
Table 2: Evaluation of the decision strategies 
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Figure 4 : DT of the example 
To solve this problem, we have to compute the possible 
optimal solution for the 4 combinations of the criteria 
(Table 3) in order to compute the stability degree of each 
decision.  
 
To identify the decision that has the highest degree of 
stability, we compute the optimal solutions and they 
probabilities and the stability degrees of the decision of 
DM1. Results are detailed in Table 3 and illustrated on 
Figure 5 (optimal decisions in each case appear in 
boldface). 
 
Combination 
Optimal 
decision 
: DM1 
Optimal 
decision 
: DM2 
Pg 
a) 
),(max ndf  
),(max ndg  
2 
one  if 1 
two if 2 
0.6*0.7=0.42 
b) 
),(max ndf  
),(max ndh  
1 
one  if 1 
two if 2 
0.6*0.3=0.18 
c) 
),( ndfLaplace  
),(max ndg  
1 
two if 1 
one if 2 
0.4*0.7=0.28 
d) 
),( ndfLaplace  
),(max ndh  
1 
two if 1 
one if 2 
0.4*0.3=0.12 
Table 3: Results of problem 
The stability degrees of decision 1 and 2 can thus be 
computed )1(1C = 0.18+0.28+0.12=0.58 ; )2(1C =0.42. 
It can be concluded that decision 1 of DM1 is the most 
stable with a degree of stability = 0.58. 
 
Figure 5 : Result of the DT computation 
4.2 Problem with imprecise optimism degree 
In the considered problem, the possible criteria are the 
Hurwicz criterion with imprecise value of optimism 
degree α. In this section, we describe how to compute the 
sets )( 22 dC

 and ),( 2112 ddC

, in this imprecise 
optimism degree context.  
 
4.2.1 Model of imprecise degree of optimism 
The model is based on the hypothesis that DM1 is able 
to give two possibility distributions on the value of α: 
possibility distribution 1~  on his/her degree of optimism 
and possibility distribution 
2
1
~  on the possible degree of 
optimism of DM2.  To evaluate the stability of decision 
(pignistic probability to be optimal), we must know the 
pignistic probability of each criteria. So, first we build 
pignistic probability distribution from possibility 
distribution (cf §2.1.2). 
4.2.2 Determination of )( 22 dC

  
In this section we give the framework of the algorithm to 
compute )(
2
2 dC

: 
– Step 1. Computation, of the value of 2  for which 
decision 2jd  changes, denoted by 
2
change , for each 
node of decision of DM2, (cf: Figure 1) 
– Step 2. Computation of the set of 2  such that 
vector 2d

 is optimal for DM 2: )(
2
2 dC

 
The maximal cardinality of )(
2
2 dC

 appears when all 
decisions are optimal for a given 
2  and each 2change  
are different for each decision nodes of DM 2. Thus, in 
the worst case, we have 21 DD   set )(
2
2 dC

.  
4.2.3 Determination of ),( 2112 ddC

 
After determining all )(
2
2 dC

, we compute the set 
),( 2112 ddC

 for each 
11 Dd  . The framework of the 
algorithm is: 
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– Step 1. Compute the value of 1  for which 
decision 11d  changes, denoted by
1
change , for each 
2d

 such that )( 22 dC

, (cf Figure 1) 
– Step 2. Build the set of 1  such that 2d

 is optimal 
vector of DM 2 and 11d  is optimal d: ),(
21
12 ddC

 
In the worst case we must compute 1D × 
1
change  for 
each )( 22 dC

 so at most 2
2
1 DD   ),(
21
12 ddC

.  
5 APPLICATION OF THE METHOD 
In this section, we apply the method on the case study 
context that has been described in the introduction: a 
dyadic supply chain where the customer, a worldwide 
dermo-cosmetic maker, has to choose a collaboration 
protocol (2 possibilities) with its packaging product 
supplier. According to the traditional collaboration 
protocol the customer has to release orders (a product, a 
quantity) and the supplier responds. A DM decision 
variable is the order lead time (here 12, 8 or 6 weeks). 
With the advanced collaboration protocol the customer 
commits on purchases associated to a family of products 
8 weeks in advance (family aggregation is related to 
supplier’s set up considerations). Then, the customer 
releases delivery needs expressed in product 1 week in 
advance. A DM decision lever is the minimal volume 
associated to the family engagement (here 50000, 
100000 or 150000 products).  
 
5.1 Problem modeling 
According to the notation defined in previous parts, we 
denote by DM1 the customer and by DM2 the supplier. 
Three sequential decisions have to be made.  
– DM1 has to define the decision protocol (2 
possibilities), 
– Then, its parameter (3 possibilities).  
– Then, DM 2 will define his lot sizing strategy (3 
possibilities).  
In addition, the performance of the supply chain will be 
subject to a global uncertain event that models the 
uncertainty of the performance due to different risk 
sources (scrap, production/transport delay, 
breakdowns…) (7 possible situations).  
DM1 has to choose one decision: the decision protocol 
with its parameter (Table 4) before DM2 chooses the lot 
sizing strategy.  
Notation Protocol decision Parameter decision 
1 Advanced collaboration Low volume (50000) 
2 Advanced collaboration Medium volume (100000) 
3 Advanced collaboration High volume (150000) 
4 Basic order Little order lead time (6w) 
5 Basic order Medium order lead time (8w) 
6 Basic order Big order lead time (12w) 
Table 4 : Notations for DM1’s decisions 
The Table 5 summarizes the problem according to the 
notations introduced in the previous part: 
Description Notation Observation 
Protocol decision within its 
parameter (DM 1) 
1d  11 Dd   
Lot sizing strategy (DM 2) 
2d  22 Dd   
Uncertain Event n Nn  
DM 1’s Hurwicz coefficient 1  11 ~   
DM 2’s Hurwicz coefficient 2  22 ~   
Table 5 : Global notations used 
According to the quantity of scenarios that have to be 
evaluated, we use a simulation tool called LogiRisk for 
the evaluation of each scenario (each leaf of the tree). 
Developed in Perl language, it is dedicated to tactic and 
mostly strategic SC planning processes. This simulator is 
based on a discrete event simulation modeling approach. 
Authors have established a generic representation of the 
different planning processes for each SC actor based on 
the MRPII (Manufacturing Resource Planning) 
processes. An upstream planning process is used 
between partners: plans are made by the customer and 
passed to its suppliers. The procedure is repeated all over 
the chain in the upstream direction. No information 
circulates downstream (Lamothe et al, 2007, Marques et 
al. 2009). 
The customer’s cost function is 2/3 average customer’s 
stock-out 1/3 average customer’s stock and supplier’s 
cost function is 1/2 average supplier’s stock-out 1/2 
average supplier’s inventory level. 
 
From those simulations we build the decision tree 
(Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6 : DT of the study 
5.2 Problem Solving 
The customer gives the two possibility distributions on 
the optimism degree of himself/herself and on the 
supplier. The optimism degrees are represented in Figure 
7. The DM1 is pessimistic (black line) and the DM2 is 
known as optimistic (grey line) by DM1. 
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Figure 7 : optimism degree (alfa) of DM 1 and DM 2 
From the simulation we build the decision tree (table 3) 
with 6 decisions for DM 1 and 3 decisions for DM 2 and 
the cost function for each DM (DM1: customer’s cost 
and DM2: supplier’s cost). 
DM1 has six possible decisions {1;2;3;4;5;6} and DM2 
three possible decision {1;2;3}. Table 6 represents the 
DT with the cost value of the study problem. 
  
  Supplier’s cost Customer’s cost 
DM1 DM2 min max min max 
1 1 7.175 7.696 0.471* 0.537* 
 2 14.516 17.563 0.415 0.475 
 3 20.436 25.396 0.411 0.453 
2 1 6.022 6.907 0.422 0.462 
 2 13.078 14.34 0.380 0.425 
 3 18.92 21.57 0.375 0.414 
3 1 5.905 6.956 0.414 0.468 
 2 12.975 14.734 0.382 0.420 
 3 18.267 21.257 0.374 0.412 
4 1 6.177 7.272 0.547 0.656 
 2 11.862 14.444 0.505 0.605 
 3 17.268 20.824 0.478* 0.554* 
5 1 6.427 6.946 0.571 0.622 
 2 12.131 13.985 0.567 0.624 
 3 17.540 20.445 0.542 0.639 
6 1 7.307 7.549 0.765 1.009 
 2 13.010 14.628 0.763 1.009 
 3 18.968 21.294 0.765 1.008 
Table 6: Data of problem 
Decision 1 of DM2 is Pareto-optimal for all decisions of 
DM1. In other worlds, decision 1 has the minimal “min” 
and minimal “max” for each decision of DM1. So, 
whatever the optimism degree of DM2, DM2 chooses 
decision 1 for each node.  
 1;5.0))1,1,1,1,1,1((2 C   )()1,1,1,1,1,1(
2
2
2 dCd

 
 
Then we compute the set ))1,1,1,1,1,1(,( 112 dC  for each 
11 Dd  . Whatever the optimism degree of DM1 
decision 1,4,5,6 can be chosen: 
 ))1,1,1,1,1,1(,(3,2 112
1 dCd  
 
DM1 has two possible optimal solutions: solution 2 and 
3. To compute ))1,1,1,1,1,1(,(
1
12 dC  we compute the 
1
change  (Figure 8): ]429.0;0[))1,1,1,1,1,1(,2(12 C  and 
]5.0;429.0[))1,1,1,1,1,1(,3(12 C  
0,41
0,42
0,43
0,44
0,45
0,46
0,47
0,48
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Figure 8 : Analysis of decision 2 and 3 
In this example ))1,1,1,1,1,1(,()( 112
1
1 dCdC   :  
]429.0;0[))1,1,1,1,1,1(,2()2( 121 CC  
]5.0;429.0[))1,1,1,1,1,1(,3()3( 121 CC  
 
To choose between decisions 2 and 3 we compute the 
pignistic probability that decision 2 is optimal: 
  992.0]429.0;0[1 Pg  and the pignistic probability 
that decision 3 is optimal:   008.0]5.0;429.0[1 Pg . 
So, DM1 chooses decision 2. 
 
From an industrial point of view, the approach presented 
in this paper could be used with two main objectives. For 
an “optimality” seeking objective, this approach allows 
imprecise information about the optimism-pessimism 
index to be used to identify the most plausible decision, 
in other words the most stable decision if the latter will 
be made numerous times. In the example presented in 
the last case study, the customer (DM1) is able to 
conclude that, according to the context defined in the 
problem, he has to prefer the advanced form of 
collaboration with a medium volume of engagement 
(family). 
 
However, the model proposed may be applied to 
emphasize and identify “risky” situations. In the 
example, a customer (DM1) confronted to supplier 
(DM2) characterized by a poor capacity to deal with high 
family volume engagement (few possibilities of family 
aggregation for example) has to give priority to the 
improvement of the basic ordering form (through order 
lead time decreasing, i.e. DM1 decision 4) compared to 
imposing an advanced ordering form with a low volume 
of engagement (DM1 decision 1). This situation 
(distinguished with * in Table 6) illustrates the necessity 
for the DM to be supported in order to rank improvement 
schemes. In the example the advanced ordering form 
may not be “the” best solution according to the context. 
6 CONCLUSION 
In this paper we focused on a decision problem in a 
dyadic collaborative supply chain. More precisely we 
addressed the problem of decision making for a 
customer, taking into account the future decision of his 
supplier under imprecise information on the criteria of 
the two SC partners. We proposed a decision method for 
the criterion ensuring optimal stability. In other words 
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we focus on the decision that has the best chance to be 
optimal under an imprecise criterion.  
 
Industrial DMs are daily confronted to the problematics 
of exploiting their empirical knowledge of their partners’ 
decisional behavior. This knowledge is rarely precise 
and quantified. Being able to exploit this knowledge may 
be a strategic advantage in term of value creation and 
conservation. The model presented in this paper and the 
associated case study illustrates the advantage to identify 
the most stable decision under imprecise knowledge, i.e. 
the most probable decision, even if research efforts have 
to be made to improve the robustness of the results 
(sensitivity analysis) and to use real life collaboration 
experience in order to express imprecise vision of 
partners’ decisional behaviors. 
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